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Abstract 
The paper demonstrates that in a two-period model with imperfect 
capital markets firms will share the costs and returns of 
general training if human capital depreciates over time. 
Analyzing the firm's choice of the level of investment and the 
sharing-rule, it is shown that in spite of cost-sharing there 
will be an inefficient provision of general training: firms will 
economize on training in order to reduce workers' expected gain 
from quitting. If training is both general and firm-specific, 
overinvestment in firm-specific training will result. 
I. Introduction 
Traditional human capital theory defines general training as 
increasing the worker's marginal product in many firms by the 
same amount (Becker 1975). Thus no firm providing it will be 
ready to share the expenses of this training since it cannot 
capture any of the returns to this investment. Only if training 
is firm-specific and thus reducing the worker's mobility as his 
marginal product is higher in the firm providing it than 
elsewhere, the firm will be ready to bear part of the costs of 
training. Hashimoto ( 1981) suggested that the parties should 
agree to share the costs and return~ to firm-specific human 
capital in a manner to minimize the loss from a possible 
separation for both parties, the exact sharing rule depending on 
the existence of transaction costs in evaluating and agreeing on 
the worker's productivities inside and outside the firm. 
In a recent paper, Barron, Black, and Loewenstein, (1989) 
estimated the effect of on-the-job-training on wage growth and 
productivity growth. They found that approximately half of the 
returns to training are received by workers, i.e. a 10% increase 
in training leads to a 3% increase in productivity but only to 
a 1. 5% increase in wage growth (Barron et al., p.10) • Human 
capital theory would suggest two interpretations for this 
observation: first, all on-the-job-training is firm-specific and 
the two parties share the costs of training equally• Second, 
approximately one half of all training is job-specific and 
workers may bear the entire costs of general training but no 
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share of the costs of specific training (Barron et al., p.11). 
Thus, if only workers pay for general training, the above 
mentionned results are only consistent with a share of firm-
specific training of at least a half. Yet several recent studies 
have shown (Topel 1986, Abraham and Farber, Altonji and Shakotko 
1987) that the coefficient of tenure is reduced dramatically 
after controlling for the quality of the employment match, which 
suggests little on-the-job-training is firm-specific. Following 
Becker, workers should ~et significantly more than half of the 
productivity growth in this case. 
Err.pirical findings of workers getting only a half of the returns 
of training when the share of firm-specific human capital is low 
can be nade plausible if arguments can be put forward in favor 
of cost-sharing of gene~al training. Indeed, in a recent paper 
Katz and Ziderman (1990) provided a rationale that firms will 
frequently share the costs of general training: If potential 
employers do not possess costless information on the extent and 
the type of worker's on-the-job-training, a recruiting firm will 
place a lower value on a recruited worker.with general training 
than the firm that tra1ned him. If the employer anticipates that 
the worker will not ge·t his full marginal product at another 
firm, this informational asymmetry enables the training firm to 
finance part or even the whole costs of general training. Under 
certain cirumstances, even only the firm and not the worker will 
be prepared to invest in general training. 
This paper presents another argument why firms should accept to 
share the costs and returns of general training even if the 
worker's marginal product is commonly known to be identical 
across firms. If in a two-period model returns to training are 
declining over time due to human capital depreciation or due to 
technical progress, an employee will prefer to stay with a firm 
paying less than his current marginal product but continuously 
providing new training than to quit and join a new firm paying 
a higher wage for his current level of human capital but not 
offering additional training. If it is assumed that capital 
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markets are imperfect so that workers prefer to join firms 
offering the highest share of training costs, and if in addition 
some plausible fair-wage requirements are met, it can be shown 
that a stable equilibrium will emerge in which the worker gets 
less than the returns to his general training and nevertheless 
has no incentive to quit even if his productivity is identical 
across firms. This effect will be the more pronounced the higher 
the rate of depreciation of human capital. In a next step the 
firm's choice of the level of investment as well as of the 
sharing-rule is analyzed. In the course of thls the firm is 
supposed to anticipate a rational worker's quit decision. We 
demonstrate that the firm's readiness to pay part of the 
training is not sufficient to eliminate the well known market 
failure of underinvestment in general training with imperfect 
capital markets. Instead the firm will control the speed of 
offering general training in order to bind the workers and the 
firm to each other: by reducing the supply of training, workers' 
expected gain from quitting is decreased and the firm's risk of 
forfeiting the returns to training is eliminated. If firm-
specific training is involved, too, it is shown that employers 
will choose too high a level of investment from a social point 
of view in order to reduce the worker's mobility. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II presents the worker's 
mobility decision. In section III the choice of investment and 
the sharing-rule by the firm is analyzed. 
II. The Worker's Mobility Decision 
The model can be thought of as a three-stage game: in the first 
stage (at the beginning of the first period) workers choose 
training firms offering the best sharing-rule. Next firms decide 
on the amount and type of training as well as on the sharing-
rule for the costs and returns of training. In the third stage 
(at the beginning of the second period) workers resolve either 
to quit or to stay with the training firm. Thus, by backward 
induction we first investigate the mobility decision of a worker 
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who has been staying with a firm for one period during which he 
got both general and firm-specific on-the-job-training. 
Contrary to the literature, in this model it is the firm and not 
the worker who decides on how much to invest in on-the-job-
training and how to sh~re the costs and returns of training, 
leaving the choice of separation w_ith the worker1 • In this 
section the employee's ~?bility decision is analyzed. The next 
section deals with the firm's decisions on investment and the 
sharing-rule which are made prior to the worker's rnobili ty 
decision. At this stage.it will be assumed that in the course of 
this the firm anticipates a rational worker's behavior 
concerning both mobility and the choice of a training firm. 
In each period (t=l,2) investment in general (G1 ,G2 ) and firm-
specific ( s 1 , S2) training takes place at costs c 1=c1 (S 1 , G1) , 
i=l,2. Costs are raising at increasing rates (i.e. c'>0,c''>0). 
Investment in the second period only yields returns in period 2, 
R2=R2 (S2 ,G2 ), whereas training in the first period raises income 
in both periods. The ~rucial assumption refers to decreasing 
returns to training: due to human capital depreciation, 
technical progress, or shifts in market demand, returns are 
declining over time. They are given by R1=R1 {S1 ,G1) in the first 
and by kR1=kR1 (S 1 ,G1), 0<k<l, in the second period. Marginal 
returns of training are decreasing (R'>0, R''<0) with respect to 
investment. In addition, we require that training is productive 
within the given time horizon, i.e. there exists a level of 
investment s 1 ,Gi' i=l,2 such that 
(la) R{S2 ) - c(S2 ) > 0, R(G2 ) - c(G2 ) > 0, 
(lb) R(S,) (l+ok) - c(G,) > o, R(G,) {l+ok} - c(G,) > o. 
is met. However, costs of first-period investment will in 
1 Of course, a worker has a certain amount of scope at the 
beginning of the first period to join a firm offering a bundle 
of general and specific training and its sharing-rule. This 
decision is modelled in the first stage of the game. 
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general exceed returns in this period: R1 (S,G)-c,(S,G)<O. The 
length of the time period has to be looked at more closely: If 
due to legal constraints the firm cannot force the worker not to 
quit until all returns to investment are yielded, it is given by 
the minimum period the employer expects the worker not to 
separate from the firm. Therefore, the length of the period ~ay 
be given institutionally (i.e. by laws of firing or quitting}. 
In reality, however, it will be substantially longer because 
workers need time both to learn the characteristics of the 
present job before making a mobility decision as.well as to find 
a new job after having chosen to quit. It is reasonable to 
suppose that this time period will be influenced by the quality 
of the job which is dependent on the amount and type of training 
and the sharing-rule as well. For simplicity it is given 
exogeneously in this model. 
When the worker's quit-decision is to be made, the level of 
investment (S,G) as well as the sharing-rule a have been decided 
upon in the previous stage. a refers to the firm's share of 
costs and returns to investment, ( 1-a) is the worker's share 
(O<a<l}. We assume that a is constant during the two periods of 
the model. It is to be noted that although the sharing-rule is 
identical for both kinds of training in this model, this will 
not affect results qualitatively as will be shown later on. The 
intuition behind is is that as soon as the firm is ready to 
share the costs of general training, it will forfeit some 
returns to general and firm-specific training in case of 
separation. Therefore, even if a lower sharing-rule for general 
training could be applied, the possibility of worker's mobility 
would nevertheless distort investment in both types of training. 
Making the mobility decision, the worker compares his wage 
inside and outside the training firm. If he takes a job at 
another firm, only his general skills can be transferred as his 
firm-specific skills do not yield returns outside the training 
firm. Having been paid 
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(2) w1 = (l-a)·[R1 (S1 ,G1 ) -c1 (·)] 
in the first period (for simplicity, compensation of unskilled 
labor is neglected, so the first-period wage will in general be 
negative) the worker gets an inside wage 
in period 2 if he does not quit and an outside wage 
( 4) ~ 2 = kR1 ( 0, G1 )__ .· 
in case of mobility .as he has to give up his firm-specific 
training at a new firm. Obviously, the worker will not separate 
from the firm if ~2 < w2 ,. i.e. if 
(5) (l-o:)·(R2 - C2) > k[R,(O,G,) - (1-a)R,(S,,G,)]. 
The l.h.s. of (5) refers to the gain from staying with the firm, 
whereas the r.h.s. gives the wage differential in case of 
separation. If G=O, so that skills are completely firm-specific, 
the worker will not quit for any level of (1-a)>O and will be 
indifferent if a=l. On the contrary, if S=O education is fully 
general. Even in this case (5) may continue to hold if the 
worker's share of additional training in the second_ period 
outweighs the losses from being paid the full marginal product 
of first-period training at another firm. Thus as R2 - c 2 > O it 
is possible that the costs and returns of general training are 
shared by the training firm and yet the worker has no incentive 
to quit even if the opportunity wage for his initial level of 
training is higher than at his present firm. This will happen if 
investment in the second period is sufficiently productive or if 
the difference between inside and outside productivity of first-
period training is sufficiently small. Of course, a high rate of 
technical progress will render the l.h.s. of (5) larger, whereas 
a high rate of human capital depreciation will decrease the 
difference on the r.h.s. of (5) since the value of training is 
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low irrespective of mobility. This result reflects the basic 
insight that there will be a trade-off between getting and 
paying for the most recent know-how on the one hand and being no 
more trained but receiving a wage equal to the full marginal 
product, on the other hand. 
It has been assumed that workers always choose training firms 
offering the highest a, i.e. bearing the largest part of the 
training costs. Yet when the quit decision is ~o be made, a 
high level of a becomes a disadvantage for the firm: rearranging 
(5), we get 
(6) a < 1 -
k[R1 (0,G1) 
as a necessary condition for no separation, indicating that a 
high share of returns for the firm will render a separation more 
profitable for the employee. Since a contract forcing the worker 
to stay with the training firm cannot be accomplished, yet 
nonetheless both the firm and the worker have to stick to the 
rules of the sharing rule in case of no separation, (6) will 
provide a upper limit for the firm's share on investment. It 
will be referred to as the "non-mobility constraint" in this 
paper. 
It is useful to look more closely at the link between a, k and 
the returns to general and firm-specific skills. Obviously, a 
higher rate of human capital depreciation (a lower value of k) 
will raise the critical value of a, enabling the firm to bear a 
larger part of investment. Thus if returns to training are 
decreasing quickly, the tie between the firm and the worker gets 
closer. This is the main explanation why firms are ready to 
share investment in general training with workers in this model. 
If k=l returns to training would not decline over time. In this 
case workers could only be tied to the training firm if marginal 
rates of returns would be increasing, which is not a plausible 
assumption. If on-the-job training gets more firm-specific, the 
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non-nobility condition will be fulfilled for a wider range of 
values a as inside productivity is increased stronger. Again 
cost-sharing becomes more attractive to the firm. This 
corresponds to the well-known negative relationship between 
mobility and the amount of firm-specific skills. 
Furthermore, for general training results are dependent on 
whether the returns to general training increase or decrease in 
firm-specific skills. If. RsG=O holds, so that returns to both 
kinds of training are independent, (6) reduces to 
kR, (S,) + Rz - Cz 
Q < 
stating that a higher G -will unambiguously reduce the firm's 
willingness to pay for general training. If RsG < O holds, the 
above result is reinforced. It will be mitigated if there are 
economies of scope between general and firm-specific skills yet 
continues to hold. Fig. 1 shows the relationship between a and 
k of returns to investment are separable in general and firm-
specific training. 
Fig.1: 
a 
1 
X - - - - - - -
...._ ______ __._ ______ k 
1 
It is easy to recognize that this result crucially hinges on the 
absence of firms paying _the full marginal product of training 
acquired elsewhere and offering additional training at the same 
tine• Yet two plausible assumptions can rule out this 
possibility: The firm would have to pay higher wages to new 
entrants with the same level of general training than to 
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employess which have been trained within the firm before. 
Obvious fairness-considerations can prevent a firm from persuing 
such a policy: working morale would be destroyed and labor 
productivity would go down as analyzed by Assar and Lindbeck 
(1988) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990). Nevertheless it is 
possible that firms offering training without a sharing rule pay 
higher wages to workers who were trained elsewhere. Yet in the 
absence of perfect capital markets no worker would join such a 
type of firm so that it could not survive as a training firm in 
the market. Even if some workers would be able to pay for 
training by themselves, they would always choose firms offering 
the highest sharing rule (i.e. paying most for training) at the 
beginning of the first period since they are free to quit and 
join another firm in the second period. 
III. The Firm's Choice of the Sharing Rule and the Level of 
Investment 
At this stage the firm's choice of the sharing-rule as well as 
of the level of investment for both types of training is 
investigated. We assume that the firm is not naive but 
anticipates the worker's mobility decision in the next stage, 
choosing s, G and a in order to maximize profits 1r which are 
given by: 
1r == a{-c1 (·) + R1 (S 1 ,G1 )(1+ok) + o[R2 (·) - c 2 (·)]}. 
The following nonnegativity constraints have to be added: 
a ~ O, 1-a ~ o; 
Si ~ 0, Gi ~ 0, i==l,2. 
Furthermore, the non-separation condition (6) has to be met: 
kR, (0, G,) 
a < 1 -
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The Lagrangian of this problem is given by: 
(7) L = o:{-c,(·) + R,(s,,G,) (l+ok) + cS[R2 (·) - c 2 (·) J} -
µ{ (o:-1) (Rz-Cz) + kR,(o,G,) - k(l-a)R,(S,,G,)}. 
The following first-order conditions can be derived: 
LG1*: a[-c,'+R,'(l+ok)] + (1-a)µkR,'(S,,G,) - µkR,'(O,G,) ~ o. 
( 11) Gz. : R2 ' ( . ) = cz ' ( . ) 
(14) µ: 
L· /J.. 
L.~o; a*·La,.=O; 
. a 
L <o • µ.- , L·µ= O; /J. 
k[R1 (0,G1) 
a < 1 -
kR, (S,,G,) + Rz - Cz 
There are different possible types of outcomes. However, (10) 
and (11) state that investment in both s2 and G2 will be 
efficient in any case: as the risk of mobility is irrelevant at 
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this stage, efficiency will hold irrespective of the chosen 
sharing rule. Furthermore, from our assumption concerning the 
pay-off period of investment in the second period we know that 
S2 as well as G2 will be strictly positive. 
It is interesting to investigate two special cases at first. If 
first-period training is fully firm-specific, G1=o and the non-
mobility constraint is not binding. Thus, µ=O holds by condition 
(14). Necessary conditions for an optimum are reduced to: 
(15) S *. 1 • 
(17) 
C I = 1 
;:::: O; 
R1 '(1+ok); 
( 1-a* ) · La• = 0 ; 
thus a* = 1. Investment is only dependent on the costs and 
returns to training. The firm chooses an efficient level of 
firm-specific training for the worker. Moreover, as (18) will be 
strictly positive in this case, it follows from (11) that the 
firm will offer the worker a sharing-rule a=l: It is ready to 
pay the entire firm-specific training. In other words, if there 
is no risk of separation, the firm is interested to get all the 
net benefits from training. Of course, it is possible to suggest 
that in this case workers would be better off by having a 
sharing-rule a<l. This could be dealt with in a possible 
extension of the model where workers are rejecting to choose 
training firms offering a sharing rule with a~a*. Yet this paper 
is primarily concerned with the case where the workers want the 
firm to increase, not to decrease the its share on costs and 
returns to training as there are no perfect capital markets. 
The second special case is concerned with training that is fully 
general, S1=0. In this case the non-negativity condition (1-a)~O 
will be of no relevance since a will be restricted by the non-
mobility constraint. Comparing (12), we recognize that the firm 
will share investment (a>O) if 
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(19) (R, - c,) = (µ-6) (Rz - Cz + kR,) 
or if 
( c 1 - R1) 
(20) µ = 6 - ~ 0 
holds2. µ is the shadow-price of the non-mobility constraint, 
~easuring the marginal ,~ncrease of profits if the non-mobility 
constraint is relaxed. It must not be too high in order to 
~otivate the firm's investment. Obviously, this shadow price 
decreases if k goes down, indicating that a higher rate of 
obsolence of first period investment will render the worker's 
outside opportunities· less attractive (fig. 2). Similarily, a 
lo~er return to first-period investment in general training will 
~ork in the same direction. Finally, if second period investment 
is very productive (i.e. R2-c2 is high), the non-mobility 
constraint will be mitigated because this provides an incentive 
for the v:orJ.:er not to gui t the training firm. 
[ig.2: 
µ 
k 
It is to be noted that if the rate of human capital depreciation 
goes up (k decreases), the r.h.s. of (20) is reduced as R,-c,<0. 
Regarding next the first-order conditions for general training, 
for µ>0 we get: 
(21) o(-c1 '+R1 '(1+ok)] = oµkR,'(S,,G,) or 
R,'(l+cSk) > c' Ma . 1 
, · rg1na returns exceeding marginal costs of 
2
µ>0 in this case if 6> (c _ hold as R (l+ok)+o(R _ ) 1 R1]/[kR1 ~c2+R2], which will always 
1 2 c2 >0 per assumption. 
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general training, the firm will choose too low an amount of 
investment from a social point of view. Thus, the well known 
result of underprovision of general training in the absence of 
perfect capital markets if only workers pay for training is not 
eliminated if firms are ready to pay part of the costs of 
general training. In order to tie the workers to the firm, it 
economizes on training expenditures by controlling the speed of 
providing general training. In the course of this lowering the 
workers' opportunity wages at another firm, the incentive to 
quit after the first period is diminished. The higher the 
shadow-price of the non-mobility constraint, the more investment 
will be hampered. Once again we recognize that a high rate of 
human capital depreciation will mitigate the inefficiency of 
investment. 
In general, training will be neither fully general nor fully 
firm-specific. As long as training is primarily specific so that 
µ=O, both Sand G will be provided at an efficient level from 
the viewpoint of a social planner. However, if the non-mobility 
constraint becomes binding as the share of general training goes 
up, there will be a distortion of investment in both general and 
firm-specific skills. Using (8) and (9) and assuming R5G=O 
yields: 
(22) S *. 1 • [-c1 '+R1 ' (l+ok) J = - [ (1-a:}/a:JµkR1 ' (S 1 ,G1} 
(23) G1*: [-c,'+R1 '(l+ok)] = µkR 1 '(S1,G1). 
Obviously, the r.h.s. of (23) is negative so that the firm is 
investing too high an amount in firm-specific training in order 
to 'induce the worker not to quit. At the same time, investment 
in general training will continue to be at too low a level from 
a social point of view. If R~>0, general training will be more 
productive at the margin within the training firm than outside, 
so that the inefficiency will be mitigated. If RsG<O, on the 
other hand, it will be reinforded. 
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The inefficient level of firm-specific training in this model 
arises as the firm does not explicitly distinguish between 
general and specific training but is only concerned with the 
nonmobility constraint. This seems to be very plausible since it 
may be impossible to distinguish between the two types of 
training in contracts explicitly. Yet even if different sharing-
rules a 5 and aG could be accomplished, the results would not be 
affected qualitatively. In this case firm's profits are given 
by: 
Nonnegativity conditions now are present for s., G,., i=l,2, and 
. I I 
a 5 , aG, 1-a5 , 1-aG. The non-mobility constraint is changed to: 
First-order conditions tor investment yield: 
S *. 1 • 05(-c,'(S) +R,'(S)(l+ok)] + (1-as)µkR,'(S,) $ O; 
aG(-c,'(G)+R,'(G)(l+ok)] + (1-aG)µkR,'(S,) - µkR,'(O,G,) $0 •. 
As long as the non-mobility constraint is binding, there will be 
a distortion of both types of training: In order not to give the 
worker an inventive to quit, the firm will restrict both the 
amount and the share of general training. However, it will offer 
the worker too high a level of firm-specific training from a 
social point of view at the same time. 
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